The Echidna Strategy

A “Plan B” for Australian Defence

(Updated 16 Nov 2024.)

It’s over…

By electing Donald Trump again the voters in the USA have made it clear they reject the liberal democratic values we hold dear.

Donald Trump pick’s for his new team reinforce this message:

Pete Hegseth: Defence. Christian nationalist with Deus Vult and other crusader tattoos. Calls for destruction of the Al-Aqsa Mosque.
Tulsi Gabbard: National Intelligence. Russian asset?
John Ratcliffe: CIA. Pro-Russian, China hawk
Mike Waltz: National Security. China hawk, pro Russian
Marco Rubio: Secretary of State. China, Iran, Venezuela hawk
Matt Gaetz: Attorney General. Likely to persecute opposition figures
Chris Wright: Energy. “There is no climate crisis”
RFK: Health. Anti-vax, anti-science.

Australia needs to carefully decouple our defence from the USA.

We have no “shared values” now!

The authoritarian world order

Liberal democracy is now in full retreat, authoritarian rulers have most of the power and the weapons.

Australia is now in a weak position with:

One operational submarine
An outnumbered and outclassed surface fleet
A small short-range air force

Australia needs another defence plan.

Don’t buy old Virginia Class submarines

We should not be sending nuclear submarines to threaten the PRC.
➧ Australia has no nuclear weapons
➧ The USA is not a reliable ally
➧ The PRC has 500+ nuclear weapons.
➧ We have eight cities.

There are many reasons not to proceed with this project:

These old submarines cost many times more than new non-nuclear submarines.
It is too dangerous for Australia to directly confront the PRC.
The USA could withdraw support at any stage over issues like abortion, healthcare, press freedom or LGBTQIA+ rights.
We could come under extreme pressure to repatriate political refugees back to the USA for prosecution.
This could drag Australia into wars with the PRC and/or Islamic countries.
Decommissioning costs will be very high.

Look at advanced non-nuclear submarines

A wide range of advanced non-nuclear submarines can provide excellent asymmetric defence within 4,000 km of Australia if distributed to ports around the country.

About NINE non-nuclear boats can be bought for the price of ONE Virginia class submarine. Non-nuclear boats are much cheaper to operate.

Non-nuclear boats	Manufacturer	Built	Submerged endurance
*Scorpène*	Naval Group / Navantia	11	3 weeks submerged if FC2G fuel cells used (diesel & O₂).
*Scorpène Evolved*	Naval Group / Navantia	0	12+ days submerged with lithium-ion batteries.
*Type 212A*	HDW / SpA	10	3 weeks submerged if PEM fuel cells.
*Blekinge A26*	Saab	0	3 weeks submerged with Stirling AIP.
*Sōryū* */ Taigei*	Mitsubishi / Kawasaki	6	4+ weeks submerged with Li-S batteries.
*KS-III*	Hanwha / Hyundai	3	3+ weeks submerged with Li-S batteries. VLS option.

Endurance comparison:

Nuclear: ~80 days (before food runs out) – no need to surface.
Non-nuclear: ~80 days (before food runs out) – need to snorkel once or twice for ~30 minutes.

Approximate cost comparison:

Old Virginia nuclear submarine: $US 4,500 million (Australian Naval Institute).
New Taigei non-nuclear submarine: $US 500 million (Australian Naval Institute).

Weapons comparison:

Old Block IV Virginia nuclear submarine: 65 missiles and torpedoes.
New Taigei non-nuclear submarine: 30 missiles and torpedoes on each boat = 9 x 30 = 270 missiles and torpedoes for the same money.

Non-nuclear boats are small enough to operate undetected in the shallow Arafura sea and other shallow water near Australia – unlike the much larger nuclear submarines.

Investigate Taigei submarines

Six Japanese submarines have been built with Lithium-Sulphur batteries to date. E one took two years to complete. Lithium-Sulphur batteries appear to be less complex to operate and support than fuel-cell systems.

Multiple boats could be assembled in parallel in various electorates around Australia.

I suggest RAN exercises with Japan to test Hobart Class vs. the new Taigei Class.

This graphic for the superseded Sōryū class suggests a submerged endurance of **one month** & 10,000km at 7 knots was feasible in 2019. (Tokio X’Press)

AUKUS submarines

The UK Labour Party will have the same issues trying to work with the new USA as we will. They may examine Anglo-French collaboration on nuclear submarines if Anglo-USA collaboration becomes infeasible.

Note also that if nuclear submarines were ever built here superpower adversaries would need to destroy them before they could be launched – which would create a major problem if they were fuelled at the time.

The best time to strike a nuclear submarine would be after the four tonnes of HEU is loaded but before the launch

Cut back on vulnerable surface combatants

In an asymmetric fight with huge navies, Australia’s few surface combatants cannot survive. We will never match the missile and shipbuilding capability of the PRC.

Existing vessels should be sold or painted white and transferred to Border Force. (See references)

The Moskva sinking on April 15, 2022 after being hit with one Ukrainian ‘Neptune’ missile (Kyiv Post)

*Dongfeng missile ranges (Wikipedia). The PRC has* *500 military satellites* *to identify and track targets.*

Join the Global Combat Air Programme

*A GCAP “Tempest” 6^th Generation fighter bomber mock-up. (ASPI*)

The GCAP is a collaboration between the UK, Japan & Italy to develop a new long-range stealth fighter.

Aircraft hidden in multiple bases around Australia can provide a more survivable deterrent to hostile superpowers than slow moving frigates with limited magazines.

Australia will need long-range stealth aircraft to penetrate the defences of hostile fleets.

The GCAP Tempest is being designed to fulfil this role. Australia should join the project now to ensure Australia’s range and payload requirements are accommodated and to see if parts can be manufactured in some Australian electorates.

The first flight of the Tempest demonstrator is expected to take place by the end of 2027.

I note that the US 6^th generation fighter program (NGAD) is now in doubt – even if these aircraft would be available for Australia to purchase.

Distribute and hide

Instead of concentrating important assets at a few easily-destroyed bases the ADF should distribute and hide assets around Australia.

As far as possible defence assets should be hidden from pervasive satellite surveillance when inactive.

Valuable P-8A Poseidon clustered at RAAF Edinburgh a few kilometres from the coast (Google Maps)

Five eyes?

Given the USA will now align with Russia and Russia is aligned with China and the DPRK it would seem that the Five Eyes intelligence sharing arrangement is less viable.

Australia should move to establish closer intelligence sharing arrangements with the other remaining liberal democracies.

A Liberal Democratic Alliance?

A version of the Freedom House map modified for mid-2025.

Some of the remaining liberal democracies (green) might try to form a new Liberal Democratic Alliance.

If so, Australia should probably try and join.

This alliance might feature:

No claim on the territories of superpower nations or Islamic states.
NATO-like security guarantees.
EU-like reciprocal health and other benefits for Alliance citizens.
EU-like free trade and economic cooperation.
Schengen-like travel arrangements for Alliance citizens.
An Alliance passport.

Other References

The cost of Australia’s defence: hard choices for the new government (Marcus Hellyer, June 2022)
Warship Vulnerability Carlo Kopp (AirPower Australia)
Just buying votes by Hugh White (The Age)
Australia’s navy is undergunned for denying long-range attackers (Malcolm Davis, ASPI)
Surface warships: it’s not all plain sailing (Andrew Davies and Mark Thomson, ASPI)
What’s the strategy for the Australian Army’s new vehicles? (Marcus Hellyer, ASPI)
LAND 400: Is a knight in shining armour really what we need? (Marcus Hellyer, ASPI)
How to defend Australia: control and denial Hugh White (ASPI)
Cheap drones versus expensive tanks: a battlefield game-changer? (Malcolm Davis, ASPI)
Land 400 combat vehicles: another disastrously wasteful defence purchase? (Nicholas Stuart, SMH)
Australia’s F-35s: Lessons from a problematic purchase (Peter Layton, Lowy Institute)
Projecting power with the F-35 (part 2): going further (Marcus Hellyer, ASPI)
Loyal wingman leads the way (Malcolm Davis, ASPI)
Sea Control with “off the shelf” AIP-equipped submarines near Australia. (Stephen Kuper, Defence Connect)
Naval Group Achieves Breakthrough With Its FC2G AIP System (Xavier Vavasseur, Naval News)
Time to start thinking about land-based anti-ship missiles (Jan K. Gleiman and Harry White, ASPI)
Shore-based anti-ship missiles: when the land commands the sea (Alex Calvo, ASPI)
Running on empty – Australia has three weeks of liquid fuel. NZ has 3 months. (David Samuel, The Spectator)
Hypersonic weapons are coming—whether we’re ready or not (Andrew Davies, ASPI)
Hypersonic anti-ship missiles – incoming? (Andrew Davies, ASPI)
Tony Abbott ‘regrets’ not finalising Sōryū submarine deal with Japan (ABC)
“Mind-boggling” waste revealed in the record rise in weapons spending (Brian Toohey, November 2020)
Australia to build its own missiles with $1bn guided weapons facility (David Crowe, The Age, Mar 2021)
Today’s F-35As Not Worth Including In High-End War Games (Joseph Trevithick, The War Zone, April 2021)
Defence’s acquisition plan risks leaving ADF with stranded assets (Marcus Hellyer, ASPI, May 2021)
Why large, expensive crewed platforms like frigates and armoured vehicles will become stranded assets (Marcus Hellyer, ASPI, May 2021)
Australia wasting $2.1 billion on unsurvivable propeller-driven drones (Bradley Perrett, ASPI, May 2021)
Australia considers German Type 214 submarine option (ABC News, May 2021.)
Australia’s new tanks are overkill and overweight (Declan Sullivan, ASPI, June 2021)
Why is Australia still investing in a “balanced” defence force? (Hans J. Ohff and Jon Stanford, ASPI, July 2021)
Managing risk in the submarine transition: the latest on the Collins life-of-type extension (Marcus Hellyer, ASPI, July 2021)
The Case For Stripping The P-8 Poseidon Down Into An Multi-Role Arsenal Aircraft (Tyler Rogoway, The Drive, July 2021)
America’s recent military history points to strategic shortcomings – Australia ultimately can rely only on itself. (Peter Hartcher, The Age, July 2021)
America’s withdrawal of choice – and the likely consequences (Richard N. Haas, ASPI, August 2021)
As the Taliban controls Afghanistan, ‘the idea you can win’ is reverberating around terrorist cells (Emily Clark, ABC, August 2021)
The big lesson from Afghanistan – time not our friend, things change quickly. (Michael Shoebridge, ASPI, September 2021)
Benefits of small, quiet conventional subs over nuclear (ASPI, Hans J. Ohff, July 2017)
The Feasibility of Ending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Fuel Use in the U.S. Navy (Arms Control Organisation, November 2016) 
How to buy a submarine (2021 edition) (Andrew Davies, ASPI, September 2021)
Australia’s nuclear submarine decision leaves more questions than answers (Marcus Hellyer, ASPI, September 2021)
Will all submarines, even nuclear ones, be obsolete and ‘visible’ by 2040? (Guardian, October 2021)
Decades before nuclear submarines in the water (ABC, October 2021)
Sea mines: the asymmetrical weapon Australia must have (Greg Mapson, ASPI, October 2021)
RAN likely to copy the Astute Class for Australia’s SSN (The Age, Oct 2021)
Suggestion to build more of existing Hobart Class warships instead of the new Hunter Class (Marcus Hellyer, ASPI, Nov 2021)
Loyal wingmen could be the last aircraft standing in a future conflict (Bradley Perrett, ASPI, Nov 2021)
RAAF should be planning the next loyal wingman (Malcolm Davis, ASPI, Dec 2021)
Coordinated seizure of Taiwan and Ukraine could happen soon (Peter Hartcher, The Age, Dec 2021)
Dumping the ADF’s MRH-90 helicopters is the right call, but why now? (Marcus Hellyer, ASPI, Dec 2021)
Australia needs new early warning capability to counter threat from new missiles (Malcolm Davies, ASPI, Dec 2021)
Implementing Australia’s nuclear submarine program (Andrew Nicholls, Jackson Dowie & Marcus Hellyer, ASPI, Dec 2021)
Australia needs to prepare for the collapse of American democracy (Dr Emma Shortis, The Age, Jan 2022)
Australia commits to $3.5 billion tank purchase from the US (The Age, Jan 2022)
That sinking feeling: the future of surface combatants (Andrew Davies, ASPI, Jan 2022)
Hunter-class frigate report indicates Australian naval shipbuilding in disarray (Marcus Hellyer, ASPI, Feb 2022)
A new low for global democracy (The Economist, Feb 2022)
Navy ‘Pathetically undergunned’ (The Age, Feb 2021)
Australia needs a radical expansion of its land-based strike capabilities (Peter J Dean, ASPI, Feb 2022)
Australian Spike missiles could have helped Ukraine, but they’re not even being built yet (Marcus Hellyer, Mar 2022)
StrikeMaster missile system for the ADF? A Bushmaster variant with a big bite (Brendan Nicholson, Feb 2022)
Now is not the time to buy lots of heavy armoured vehicles (Michael Shoebridge, Mar 2022)
Air Force’s SkyGuardian or Reaper lethal drones cancelled (Canberra Times, Apr 2022)
Australia’s navy not equipped to meet the threat from PLA anti-ship cruise missiles (Sam Goldsmith, Apr 2022)
Aukus pact extended to development of hypersonic weapons (Guardian, Apr 2022)
Making sense of Australia’s salvo of missile announcements (Marcus Hellyer, Apr 2022),
Hunter-class frigates won’t meet the RAN’s needs (Paul Greenfield and Jon Stanford, ASPI, Apr 2022)
Surface ships and armoured vehicles are on borrowed time (Andrew Davies, Apr 2022)
Peter Dutton says Australia should be prepared for war – but are we? (Daniel Hurst, Apr 2022)
Anduril bets it can build 3 large autonomous subs for Aussies in 3 years (Australian Defence, May 2022)

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